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Abstract:  This study investigates the role of the government in economic growth by 
extending the neo classical production function  to incorporate two dimensions of  the 
government – a size and a quality dimension.  The government size and quality  
augmented model,  where size is measured by government expenditure and quality by 
governance, is   tested on a cross section of 71 economies. Estimation is also carried 
out on the sample by income distribution. The  empirical results  indicate  that both 
the size and quality of the government are important for economic growth.  It is 
argued that  investing in the capacity for enhanced governance is a priority for the 
improved growth performance of the countries examined.   
Keywords:  economic growth, government size, government expenditure,  
government quality, governance 




















1    Introduction 
There is no government in the standard neo classical production function.   A 
government  however, plays an important role in the distribution and allocation of 
resources. Moreover, the government is crucial for social organization, laws and  
political stability. Certain goods such as education, health and defense that the private 
sector finds difficult to provide, are  made available by the government.  This study 
investigates the role of the government in economic growth by extending the  neo 
classical production function  to incorporate two dimensions of  the government – a 
size dimension and  quality dimension. The size dimension as measured by  public 
expenditure, has been incorporated in the work of Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996), 
Hulton (1996), Pritchett (1996), Aschauer (2000).   
 
Much less attention has been paid to the quality dimension which underpins the 
efficient provision of public goods. The studies of Acemoglu et al. (2008), Barro 
(1999) and Torsten and Tabellini (2007) examine the relationship between democracy 
and economic growth. There is also a literature that investigates the laws governing 
investor protection.  La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) examine the effects of investor 
protection on the financial system.  They conclude that countries in which  legal 
systems provide proper protection to investors against expropriation by entrepreneurs, 
are likely to have   larger and better developed financial markets.  This in turn  implies 
that countries with well developed financial markets  exhibit faster economic growth 
– see King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000) among others. As in the case of financial markets, it can be argued that a well 
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developed legal system   contributes to the more efficient provision of public goods 
which in turn  leads to increased economic growth.  
 
The empirical evidence on the relation between economic growth and government 
investment has been mixed.  Barro (1991) in a study of 98 developed and developing 
economies finds a positive but insignificant relation between public investment and 
economic growth over the 1960-1985 period.  Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find a 
positive association between public investment and economic growth, in particular, 
transport and communication. Devarajan et al. (1996) find a negative relation between 
the capital component of public investment and economic growth for a group of 
developing economies.  They attribute this to the misallocation of public capital 
expenditure by developing countries causing them to be unproductive at the margin.    
 
The studies of  Hulton (1996), Pritchett (1996) and Aschauer (2000)  examine the 
effectiveness of public capital in economic growth. Pritchett  argues that public 
investment may not create productive capital in the developing countries due to 
inappropriate use. His argument is based on estimates of  an implied relative 
effectiveness coefficient on public capital investment which is defined as the ratio of 
government investment that passes into public capital growth if the returns to capital 
on private and public capital are equal. Hulton constructs an index of government 
capital effectiveness by aggregating mainline telephone faults per 100 telephone calls, 
electricity generation losses as a percent of total output, the percentage of paved roads 
in  good condition and diesel locomotive availability as a percent of the total. 
Assigning each of these indicators quartile rankings and then averaging across these 
rankings to obtain an aggregate infrastructure effectiveness index, he finds that  
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infrastructure effectiveness is the single most important variable explaining growth 
differentials between countries.  Aschauer, uses the same indicators as Hulton, 
however, normalizes each indicator rather than assigning it a quartile ranking and 
averages the normalized indicators to construct  a public capital effectiveness index. 
Examining  both the effects of the quantity and effectiveness of public capital on 
economic growth, Aschauer  concludes that both these factors lead to increases in 
output per head.   
 
The present study differs from the studies of Hulton, Pritchett and Aschauer in that it 
uses the  governance indicators  complied by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) 
to construct a composite governance index which is  then used to identify four levels 
of governance – very high, high,  low, very low.  Ranking  the governance indicators 
this way  enables examining the differential impact of each level of governance 
(government quality) on economic growth
1
.  While poor governance can be regressive 
to sustained growth,  good governance acts to improve the efficiency of the stock of 
public  capital. 
 
Public investment can lead to enhanced  growth.  However, certain countries  already 
allocate a large proportion of public resources to the provision of social services and  
further increases in government spending may or may not improve economic growth.    
The purpose of the present study is  to address the question of how government 
quality as measured by governance and government size as measured by public 
expenditure underpins the growth process in a cross section of  countries.  What 
distinguishes this paper from  previous studies  that have examined the role of the 
                                                 
1
 This was suggested to me by the Editor of the journal, Paul Wachtel. 
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government in economic growth is that it  introduces a governance variable  into the 




Using cross sectional data for 71 countries, developed, developing and transition, over 
the 1996-2003 period, the study finds a positive relation between government 
expenditure, governance and economic growth. Quah  (1996)  shows that cross 
country studies, by grouping countries at different levels of development together 
could omit the thresholds of development.   In order to account for the heterogeneity 
of countries in the sample, the countries are also  grouped by income distribution.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents the model.  Section 3 
describes the data.  Section 4 evaluates the empirical results and Section 5 
summarizes the conclusions. 
 
2    The Cobb-Douglas Specification 
 
The Solow augmented Mankiw-Romer-Weil (MRW) model is used as a basis for this 
study.  The  production function incorporating the size and quality of the government 
is of the Cobb-Douglas form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )y t Ak t h t g t eα β µθ γ=          (1) 
where ( )y t  is output per worker;  ( )k t is the stock of private capital per worker; and 
( )h t is the stock of human capital per worker.  The size dimension of the government  
( )g t , is measured by the stock of government capital per worker, and θ  measures the 
quality dimension of the government.  The exponential form is assumed for the 
                                                 
2
 This is different to the Hulton (1996), Pritchett (1996) and Aschauer (2000) studies which incorporate 
a government effectiveness variable as proxy for government quality. In the empirical estimation, 
governance is entered as a series of dummy variables ranging from very high to very low in the current 
study which also distinguishes it from the Hulton, Pritchett and Aschauer  studies.   
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quality variable as good governance is not a direct factor input but serves to  improve 
the efficiency of the stock of government capital.  
 
In   steady state equilibrium, there is an exogenous rate of technological progress ϖ 
and growth rate of the labour force n .   The stock of capital   depreciates at a rate  δ .  





s  and  
G
s , the steady state level of per capita output  is reached 
when the addition to the stock of each type of capital is just sufficient to meet the 
growth rate of the labour force  and to replace capital which depreciates at a rate of δ.  





where 4a = µγ .    
The growth rate of output per worker in the transition to steady state can  be expressed: 
[ ]ln ( ) ln (0) (1 ) ln( *) ln (0)ty t y e y yλ−− = − −       (3) 
where (0)y  is the initial level of output per  worker and *y  is the steady state level of 
income per worker. The λ  is the speed of convergence and  
(1 )( )nλ α β γ ϖ δ= − − − + +  (see Barrro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  Subtracting (0)y  
from both sides of the equation and substituting for *y  yields  the transitional model 
that can be estimated:   
0 1 2 3 4ln ( ) ln (0) ln ln ln
GK H
ss s
y t y a a a a a
n n n
θ
ϖ δ ϖ δ ϖ δ
    − = + + + + +    + + + + + +     
                            5 ln (0)a y ε+                  (4) 
*
0 1 2 3 4
( )




a a a a a
L t n n n
θ
ϖ δ ϖ δ ϖ δ
      = + + + +      + + + + + +      
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According to equation (4), the growth rate of income per capita depends on  the 
accumulation of private capital, human capital, public capital and good governance. 
Applying the same reasoning as Hulton (1996), a country with better governance will 
converge to a higher level of steady state income per capita than a country with poor 
governance.  If  they  start at the same level of income per capita, the country with 
better governance will experience a faster rate of growth. Equation  (4)  is estimated 
in Section 4 for the full sample and by groups of countries based on income 
distribution. 
 
 3    Data      
The sample comprises a cross section of  71  countries, developed,  developing  and 
transition (see Appendix).  The reason for the choice of countries is twofold.  One, 
data for all the governance variables are available for this group  of countries.  Two, 
the sample is chosen so as to capture countries at all four levels of governance (see 
below).  As the earliest for which  the governance indicators are available is 1996, the 
data used for the  estimation  covers the period 1996-2003 and are annual.  The data in 
this study have been obtained from the following sources: 
GDP Per Capita ( / )Y L :  World Development Reports and Human Development 
Reports. 
Government Expenditure to GDP ( )
G
s :   The size of the government is measured by 
the share of government expenditure to GDP.  This variable is used in   Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2005), Devarajan et al. (1996) as  proxy for the government. This data are 
from the World Development Indicators. 
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Share of Private  Investment to GDP ( )
K
s :  The private investment series is 
constructed as in Easterly and Rebelo (1996) by subtracting the public investment 
series from total investment.  
Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio (s
H
):  is used as proxy for human capital (
H
s ) as in 
MRW. The data are  from the  Human Development Reports. 
ϖ δ+ :  The sum of the growth rate of technology, ϖ , and the rate of depreciation, δ , 
are assumed to be 0.05 as in MRW.  While this assumption may not seem appropriate 
for all countries in the sample, it provides an useful benchmark for testing the model 
in question.  This assumption has been used in the work of Aschauer  (2000), Hulton 
(1996),   among others for both the developed and developing economies. 
Credit/GDP:  is used to  measure the role of the financial sector in economic growth.   
Rousseau and Wachtel (2005),  Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck et al. (1999),   among 
others highlight the importance of the role of finance in economic growth. Gerhard  et 
al. (2008)  show that  European Union (EU) accession economies in which   financial 
market segments – credit, bond and stock markets – have links to the public sector 
exhibit growth and stability.  Similarly, Arritabel et al. (2007), examine economic 
growth focusing on aspects related to the labour market, investment and financial 
markets in the Central and Eastern European EU member states. To control for the 
potential impact of the financial sector on economic growth therefore, the credit/GDP 
ratio is used as a regressor in the ensuing empirical analysis.  This data are from the 
World Development Indicators. 
Share of Public Investment to GDP:  World Development Indicators.  
Government Education Expenditure as percentage of GDP, Government Health 
Expenditure as percentage of GDP, Government Military Expenditure as percentage 
of GDP, population growth rate:  Human Development Reports  
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Governance Dummy Variables:  The governance dummy variables are based on the  
governance database compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006).  
Kaufmann et al. have constructed six indicators of governance – (1) voice and 
accountability: the degree  to which a country’s citizens are able to  participate in the 
political decision making process  (2)  political stability and absence of violence:  
measures the stability of a government to  political violence and terrorism  (3)  
government effectiveness  measures the capability of a government to implement 
effective policies and  maintain credibility (4)  regulatory quality is  the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement  sound policies that encourage  private sector  
participation  (5)  rule of law is  the existence of a good legal system including 
property rights and enforcement of contracts  (6)  control of corruption measures  the 
degree to which public power is diverted from  private gain.  These indicators range 
from a value of -2.5 to +2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
The governance dummy variables in the present study are constructed as follows. The 
individual  indicators for the initial year are averaged to construct an overall 
composite governance  index (quality index). This composite governance index 
ranges from a value of -2.5 to +2.5.  To distinguish between the different levels of 
governance from very high to very low, four governance dummy variables are 
identified: 
















          
where  θ  is the composite governance index3.   
                                                 
3
 The composite governance indicator does not take on a value of  above 2 for any of the countries in 
the  sample in 1996.  Many of the developed countries have composite governance indicators in the 
 10 
4 Empirical Results 
I   Results for the Transition Model 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents results for the transition model.  The dependent variable 
is the change in income per capita between 2003 – 1996.  This growth rate is related 
to the initial values of all the independent variables and the governance dummy 
variables. Equations (1)   and (2) are estimated without the government. Equation (2) 
incorporates the financial sector as  measured by credit/GDP. The inclusion of 
credit/GDP in equation (2) significantly increases the explanatory power of the model 
and is therefore maintained as a regressor in equations (3)-(7).  Equation (3)  
incorporate  government size and equation (4) government quality. Three dummy 
variables are defined   for ‘very high’ governance, ‘high’ governance and ‘low’ 
governance  with  ‘very low’ governance  as the reference group. The model is 
estimated with regional dummies in equation (5).  Selecting the high income 
developed country group  as the base group, five regional dummies are defined for: 
(1)  Asia and the Pacific, (2) South America and the West Indies, (3) Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (4) the Middle East and (5) Africa.   
 
The coefficients of key interest are government expenditure/GDP and the governance 
dummy variables.  The estimated coefficients on government expenditure and the 
governance dummy variables are significant in all equations.  The  inclusion of the 
governance dummy variables  increase the explanatory power of the models from 0.40 
to 0.63 – 0.67.   The effect of the governance dummy variables can be interpreted as 
follows. In equation (4) for example, the estimated coefficients on the  governance 
dummy variables suggest  that, countries with ‘very high’ governance grow   
                                                                                                                                            






 -1)] ≈  8.33%  faster than countries with ‘very low’ governance, and those 
with ‘high’ governance grow  8.11% faster, and countries with ‘low’ governance 
grow   5.65% faster than countries with ‘very low’ governance.  
 
The estimated coefficients on   private  capital indicate a positive effect  on  growth, 
however, these estimates are significant only in equations (2), (6) and (7) and at the 
10% level.  The estimates for human capital and   the financial sector  are statistically 
significant  in all equations. 
 
 
In order to see if  the effect of government expenditure varies across countries 
according to  the level of governance,  the model is estimated with  interaction terms  
for government size and the  level of governance, see equation (6).  The purpose of 
incorporating the interaction terms for government size and quality are to see if 
countries with good governance make more effective  use of public expenditure   
and/or  if increased public expenditure leads to improved governance. Only the 
interaction term for the ‘very high’ governance group is significant  suggesting that  
government expenditure is used more effectively in this group leading to higher 
growth.   
 
The equations are also estimated with interaction terms for credit/GDP and the  
governance dummy variables to examine the differential effect of credit on countries 
with different levels of governance.  The interaction terms for the ‘very high’ and 
‘high’ governance groups are significant at the 10% level suggesting that good 
governance is a pre-condition for growth enhancing finance or alternatively that 
growth enhancing finance leads to good governance.  
[Table 1, about here] 
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The coefficients on the initial level of income are negative  and statistically significant 
in all equations suggesting convergence between the countries.  The rate of 
convergence in the equations are in the range of 0.016 and 0.033 which are close to 
the Hulton (1996) Table 3 convergence estimates.  The rate of convergence is higher 
in the equations with  the governance dummy variables. 
 
11   Robustness Tests 
The problem of endogeneity in growth models is widely documented in the literature.  
In order to correct for endogeneity  and ensure that the results are robust, dummy 
variables (see equation (5) Table 1) and   the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
are used.  Estimation is also carried out by dividing the sample by income 
distribution.   
Dummy Variables 
The use of dummy variables is justified in the work of Temple (1998) and Koop, 
Osiewalski and Steel (1995) who point out that differences in technology are more 
likely to arise between different regions rather then within them.  Similarly, 
differences in governance are likely to be greater between regions than within them. 
Hence, the  governance  augmented model is also estimated  with  regional dummies 
in Table 1 - see equation (5).  All of the regional dummy variables are positive.  Only 
the regional dummy for Asia and the Pacific is significantly marginally different from 
the mean growth rate.  The inclusion  of the regional dummies however, do not 





GMM Estimation  
The GMM method is used to correct for any potential endegeneity bias.  Two 
diagnostic tests are carried out on the GMM estimates.  A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(1954, 1973, 1978)  and the J statistic of Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996). The 
equations are estimated using voice and accountability, government effectiveness  and 
political stability as instruments
4
.  The GMM estimates are reported on Table 2. The 
estimated coefficients on physical capital are significant at the 5% and 10% levels.  
This however, does not change the estimated effect of government size and quality on 
economic growth.  Government expenditure is significant at the 5% and 10% levels as 
in Table 1. The p value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics indicate that the 
null hypothesis of exogenity cannot be rejected and the  p value for the J statistic 
suggests that over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
[Table 2, about here] 
 
Dividing the Sample by Income Distribution 
In order to see if   poorer countries  are growing at a faster rate than  richer ones, the 
estimation is also carried out by dividing the sample into three groups – low income,   
middle income and high income (see Quah 1996, Temple 1998)
5
. The seemingly 
unrelated (SUR) regression technique is used for estimation to take into account the 
contemporaneous cross equation error correlation. Table 3 reports  SUR estimates for  
the  transition model by income distribution.   
[Table 3, about here] 
 
 
                                                 
4
   The instruments are selected on the basis of the partial correlation coefficient of Shea (1997). 
5
 Income groups are selected according to the World Bank classification.   
 14 
In equation (1), two  dummy variables are defined  for low and very low governance 
with other  (very high, and high governance) as the omitted group;  in equation (2),  
two  dummy variables are defined  for high and low  governance with  other (very 
high and very low) as the omitted group; and  in equation (3), two dummy variables 
are defined  for very high and high  governance with other (low and very low) as the 
omitted group.  The estimates of the variables of interest which are the governance 
dummy variables and  public expenditure/GDP are statistically significant. In equation 
(1) for example, the growth rate in the low income group with low governance is 
1.98% lower than in the benchmark group and the growth rate in the low income 
group with very low governance is 2.98% lower than in the base group.   
 
The convergence rates suggest that the low income group is growing at a faster rate 
than the middle and high income groups.  The results are consistent with  those of  
Quah  and Temple who find that the poorest income group grows at a faster rate than 
the rest of the countries.  They also find  that the growth rate of the middle income 
group is relatively stagnant.  The results of the present study suggest that the middle 
income group also grows, however, at a lower pace.    The explanatory power of  the 
three income groups are in the range of 41%-43%.  
 
III    The Disaggregated Model 
Results for the Full Sample 
In this section government size is  disaggregated into:  government investment and 
government consumption (as in Barro 1991), and  into  health, education and military 
expenditure (see Easterly and Rebelo and 1993 and Devarajan et al. 1996 for a 
sectoral analysis of government size).  The results are reported on Table 4.  
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Government  consumption has a positive and insignificant impact on economic 
growth while government investment has a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth.  Equation (1) shows that a 10% increase in public investment will 
lead to a 2.6% increase in output per head over 7 years. The governance dummy 
variables in equations (3) and (4) are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
The estimated coefficients on human capital are positive  and significant in all 
equations and the coefficients on private capital are  significant at the 10% level in 
equations (2) and (3).  In contrast  to the findings of Devarajan et al. and Hulton 
(1996), health has a positive and significant impact on economic growth. Education 
also has a positive significant effect on growth while military expenditure is not 
significant.   
[Table 4, about here] 
 
 
Results for the Disaggregated Model by Income Distribution 
The disaggregated models are re-estimated by income distribution.  Table 5 reports 
results for the government expenditure disaggregated models by global income 
distribution. 
[Table 5, about here] 
 
 
The estimated negative coefficients on the initial levels of per capita income are 
consistent with convergence.  The estimated coefficient on government investment  is 
positive and significant at the 10% level in all three income groups. The coefficient on   
government  consumption  is insignificant and positive in the middle and high income 
groups and  negative in the low income group.  Health and education have a positive 
significant impact on growth.  The governance dummy variables are entered in the 
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same manner as they are in Table 3 for the three income groups.  The estimated 
coefficients on these variables are all significant suggesting that good governance 
promotes economic growth. 
 
5    Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of government size and quality on economic growth 
in  71  economies.  The model is also estimated by  grouping the countries  by  
income distribution. The results indicate that both  increased public spending and 
good governance can improve  growth outcomes.  There is also evidence of an 
interaction between government expenditure and governance which suggests that 
countries with good governance make more effective use of public expenditure and/or  
that increased public expenditure  leads to improved governance. Similarly  there is 
evidence of an interaction between good governance and credit suggesting that good 
governance is a pre-condition for growth enhancing finance and/or vice versa. Human 
capital is also found to significantly and positively affect economic growth. The 
model restrictions hold up with   evidence of convergence among the income groups.   
The results are consistent with those of  Hulton, Aschauer and Prichett who show that 
improving the efficacy of  public capital  can  lead to improved growth.   In 
conclusion it can be stated that  countries should promote good governance to 








Countries used in study:  
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Central African 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Germany, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Moldova, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovania, Somalia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, Zambia. 
Country Groups by Income Level: 
Low Income – Armenia, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Moldova, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Viet Nam, 
Zambia 
Middle Income – Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, China, Columbia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey 
High Income –  Australia,  Austria, Canada,  Denmark, Germany, Luxemburg, 
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Table 1:  Transition to Steady State OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L) 2003 - ln(Y/L) 1996  
 Without Govt. With Govt. 
Size 
With Govt. Size and Quality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) 
































































Very High Governance 
Dummy  




































Very High Governance 
















High Governance Dummy 
* Govt. Exp/GDP 
- - - - - 0.03 
(0.02) 
- 
Low Governance Dummy 
* Govt. Exp/GDP 
- - - - - 0.02 
(0.01) 
- 
Very High Governance 































Low Governance Dummy 





















South America and the 
West Indies 






Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 


































Convergence Rate         
λ 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.022 0.033 0.020 0.022 

















        





Table 2:  Transition to Steady State GMM Estimation 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L) 2003 - ln(Y/L) 1996  
 Without Government With Govt. 
Size 
With Govt.  Size 
and Quality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 


































Very High Governance 
Dummy 
- - - 0.07 
(0.03)** 
High Governance Dummy - - - 0.06 
(0.02)*** 






























J statistic: p value 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.50 
Note: Standard errors  reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 























Table 3:   Transition to Steady State by Global Income Distribution: SUR 
Estimation 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L) 2003 - ln(Y/L) 1996  
 Low Income Middle Income High Income 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 






























Very High Governance Dummy - - 0.04 
(0.01)*** 


















Convergence Rate    
λ 0.015 0.011 0.010 
2R  0.41 0.42 0.43 
Note: Standard errors   reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 

























Table 4:  Transition to Steady State Model in the  Disaggregated  Model 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L) 2003 - ln(Y/L) 1996  
 With Govt. Size With Govt. Size and Quality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 

























































































2R  0.45 0.64 0.64 0.82 






















Table 5:   Transition to Steady State by Global Income Distribution  in the 
Disaggregated Models:  SUR Estimation 
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L) 2003 - ln(Y/L) 1996  
 With Government Size and Quality 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Variable Low Income Group Middle Income Group High Income Group 























































Public Consumption -0.04 
(0.24) 
-  0.05 
(0.23) 
-  0.06 
(0.22) 
- 


















Very High Governance 
Dummy 













































2R  0.43 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Notes: Standard errors   reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***,  significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 
